Analyze Performance
Analyze the Data
The basic steps for analyzing EVM data are
Analyze performance:
validate the data,
determine what variances exist,
probe schedule variances to see if activities are on the critical path,
develop historical performance data indexes,
graph the data to identify any trends, and
review the format 5 variance analysis for explanations and corrective actions.
Project future performance:
identify the work that remains,
calculate a range of EACs and compare the results to available funding,
determine if the contractor’s EAC is feasible, and
calculate an independent date for program completion.
Formulate a plan of action and provide analysis to management.
These steps should be taken in sequence because each step builds on findings from the previous one. Developing independent EACs without first validating the EVM data is not recommended. It is important to understand what is causing problems before making projections about final program status. For example, if a program is experiencing a negative schedule variance, it may not affect the final completion date if the variance is not associated with an activity on the critical path or if the schedule baseline represents an early “challenge” date. Therefore, it is a best practice to follow the analysis steps so that all information is known before making independent projections of costs at completion.
Validate the Data
It is important to make sure that the CPR data make sense and do not contain anomalies that would make them invalid. If existing errors are not detected, then the data will be skewed, resulting in erroneous metrics and poor decision making. To determine if the data are valid, analysts should check all levels of the WBS, focusing on whether there are errors or data anomalies such as:
negative values for ACWP, BAC, BCWP, BCWS, or EAC;
unusually large performance swings (BCWP) from month to month;
BCWP and BCWS data with no corresponding ACWP;
BCWP with no BCWS;
BCWP with no ACWP;
ACWP with no BCWP;
ACWP that is far greater or less than the planned value;
inconsistency between EAC and BAC—for example, no BAC but an EAC or a BAC with no EAC;
ACWP exceeds EAC; and
BCWP or BCWS exceed BAC.
If the CPR data contain anomalies, the performance measurement data may be inaccurate. For example, a CPR reporting actual costs (ACWP) with no corresponding earned value (BCWP) could indicate that unbudgeted work is being performed but not captured in the CPR. Or, it could mean that an accounting error occurred in a previous reporting period that is now being reconciled. Another reason could be work that was behind schedule is finally being done; in this case there would be BCWP without BCWS because the work is occurring later than planned. Case study 25 highlights CPR data with these anomalies.
Based on analysis of James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) contractor EVM data over 17 months, GAO found that some of the data used to conduct the analyses were unreliable. First, GAO found that both Northrop Grumman and Harris were reporting optimistic EACs that did not align with their historical EVM performance and fell outside the low end of our independent EAC range. Second, GAO found various anomalies in contractor EVM data for both contractors that they had not identified throughout the 17-month period we examined. The anomalies included unexplained entries for negative values of work performed (meaning that work was unaccomplished or taken away rather than accomplished during the reporting period), work tasks performed but not scheduled, or actual costs incurred with no work performed. For Northrop Grumman, many were relatively small in value ranging from a few thousand to tens of thousands of dollars. These anomalies are problematic because they distort the EVM data, which affects the projection of realistic EACs. GAO found that these anomalies occurred consistently within the data over a 17-month period, which brought into question the reliability of the EAC analysis built upon this information. NASA did not provide explanations into the anomalies for either contractor. While the contractors were able to provide explanations for the anomalies upon request, their explanations or corrections were not always documented within EVM records. Some of the reasons the contractors cited that were not in the EVM records included tasks completed later than planned, schedule recovered on behind schedule tasks, and replanning of customer-driven tasks. Without reconciling and documenting data anomalies, and utilizing reliable data for the risk-adjusted EAC, the JWST project did not have a reliable method to assess its cost reserve status going forward. This meant that some of the cost information the project officials used to inform their decision making may have failed to indicate true program performance, and as result, project management may not have had a solid basis for decision making.
GAO recommended that to resolve contractor data reliability issues and ensure that the project obtained reliable data to inform its analyses and overall cost position, the NASA Administrator direct JWST project officials to require the contractors to identify, explain, and document all anomalies in contractor-delivered monthly earned value management reports. In February 2016, NASA issued letters to the contractors requiring them to explain all anomalies in the contractor earned value management reports.In addition to checking the data for anomalies, the analyst should verify that the CPR data are consistent across formats. For example, the analyst should review whether the data reported on the bottom line of format 1 matches the data on the bottom line of format 2. The analyst should also assess whether program cost is consistent with the authorized budget.
Determine Variances
Cost and schedule variances from the baseline plan give management at all levels information about where corrective actions are needed to bring the program back on track or to update completion dates and EACs. While variances are often perceived negatively, they provide valuable insight into program risk and its causes. Variances empower management to make decisions about how best to handle risks. For example, management may decide to allocate additional resources or hire technical experts, depending on the nature of the variance.
Because negative cost variances are predictive of a final cost overrun if performance does not change, management needs to focus on containing them as soon as possible.
Probe Schedule Variances for Activities on the Critical Path
Analysts should determine whether schedule variances are from activities on the critical path. If they are, then the program will be delayed, resulting in additional cost unless other measures are taken. The following methods are often used to mitigate schedule problems:
consuming schedule reserve if it is available,
diverting staff to work on other tasks while dealing with unforeseen delays,
preparing for follow-on activities early so that transition time can be reduced,
consulting with experts to determine whether process improvements can reduce task time,
adding more people to speed up the effort, and
working overtime.
Caution should be taken with adding more people or working overtime because these options cost money. In addition, when too many people work on the same thing, communication tends to break down. Similarly, working excessive overtime can make staff less efficient.
A reliable network schedule that is kept current is a critical tool for monitoring program performance. Carefully monitoring the contractor’s network schedule will allow for determining when forecasted completion dates differ from the planned dates. Activities may be re-sequenced or resources realigned to reduce the schedule delay. It is also important to determine whether schedule variances are affecting downstream work. For example, a schedule variance may compress the durations of remaining activities or cause “stacking” of activities toward the end of the program, to the point at which success may no longer be realistic. If this happens, then an overtarget schedule may be necessary (discussed in chapter 20).
Various schedule measures should be analyzed to better understand the impact of schedule variances. For example, the amount of total float, as well as the number of activities with lags, date constraints, or lack of progress should be examined each month.54 Some indicators of poor schedule health:
Excess total float usually indicates that the schedule logic is flawed, broken, or absent. Large total float values should be checked to determine if they are real or a consequence of incomplete scheduling.
Date constraints typically are substitutes for logic and can mean that the schedule is not well planned.
Lags are typically reserved for time that is unchanging, does not require resources, and cannot be avoided (as in waiting for concrete to cure), but lags are often inappropriately used instead of logic to force activities to start or finish on a specified date.
If open work packages are not being statused regularly, it may be that the schedule and EVM are not really being used to manage the program. Analyzing these issues can help assess the schedule’s accuracy.
In addition to monitoring tasks on the critical path, close attention should be paid to near-critical tasks, as these may alert management to potential schedule problems. If an activity is not on the critical path but is experiencing a schedule variance, it may be turning critical. Therefore, schedule variances should be examined for their causes. For instance, if material is arriving late and the variance will disappear once the material is delivered, its effect is minimal. But, if the late material is causing activities to slip, then its effect is much more significant.
A negative schedule variance eventually disappears when the full scope of work is completed because at this point the amount of work accomplished is equal to the amount of work planned. However, a negative cost variance is not corrected unless work that has been overrunning begins to underrun—a highly unlikely occurrence. Schedule variances are usually followed by cost variances, because as schedule increases various costs such as labor, rented tools, and facilities increase. The amount of the estimate due to inflation typically increases also. Additionally, management tends to respond to schedule delays by adding more resources or authorizing overtime.
Develop Historical Performance Data Indexes
Performance indexes are measures of program efficiency that indicate how a program is performing. Performance indexes determine the effect a cost or schedule variance has on a program. For example, a $1 million cost variance in a $500 million program is not as significant as it is in a $10 million program. Table 23 provides three performance indexes and describes what each indicates about program status.
Table 23: EVM Performance Indexes
Index | Formula | Indicator |
---|---|---|
Cost performance index (CPI) | CPI = BCWP / ACWP | The CPI metric is a measure of cost expended for the work completed. A CPI value greater than 1.0 indicates the work accomplished cost less than planned, while a value less than 1.0 indicates the work accomplished cost more than planned.a |
Schedule performance index (SPI) | SPI = BCWP / BCWS | The SPI metric is a measure of the amount of work accomplished versus the amount of work planned. An SPI value greater than 1.0 indicates more work was accomplished than planned, while an SPI value less than 1.0 indicates less work was accomplished than planned.a |
To complete performance index (TCPI) | TCPI = BCWR / (EAC - ACWP)b | The TCPI is a comparison of the amount of work remaining to the budget remaining. It is the calculated projection of cost efficiency that must be achieved on the remaining work to meet a specified goal, such as BAC or EAC. The performance efficiency need to complete the project is often more than the previous level of performance achieved. The TCPI can be compared to a CPI to test the EAC’s reasonableness and used as the basis for discussion of whether the performance required is realistic.c |
Source: DOD and PMI. | GAO-20-195G
aDOD, OUSD A&S (AE/AAP), Earned Value Management Implementation Guide, (Washington, D.C.: January 2019).
bBCWR = budgeted cost of work remaining, or BAC - BCWP.
cProject Management Institute, Inc. Practice Standard for Earned Value Management, Second Edition, 2011.
The cost performance index (CPI) and schedule performance index (SPI) can be used independently or together to forecast a range of cost estimates at completion. They also give managers early warning of potential problems that need correcting to avoid adverse results.
Like variances, performance indexes should be investigated. An unfavorable CPI—one less than 1.0—may indicate that work is being performed less efficiently or that material is costing more than planned. Or it could mean that more expensive labor is being employed, unanticipated travel was necessary, or technical problems were encountered. Similarly, a mistake in how earned value was taken or improper accounting could cause performance to appear to be less efficient. More analysis is needed to know what is causing an unfavorable condition. Likewise, favorable cost or schedule performance indexes may stem from errors in the EVM system, not necessarily from work taking less time than planned or underrunning its budget. Thus, failure to assess the full meaning behind the indexes runs the risk of basing estimates at completion on unreliable data.
An SPI different from 1.0 warrants more investigation to determine what effort is behind or ahead of schedule. Analysts should examine the WBS to identify issues at the activity level associated with completing the work. Using this information, management could decide to reallocate resources, where possible, from activities that might be ahead of schedule (SPI greater than 1.10) to help activities that are struggling (SPI less than 0.90) to get back on track. There should also be an analysis of the available float of activities that are slipping to see if proactive steps should be taken so resources are allocated more efficiently to future activities.
If the TCPI is much greater than the current or cumulative CPI, then the analyst should discover whether this gain in productivity is even possible. If not, then the contractor is most likely being overly optimistic. A rule of thumb is that if the TCPI is more than 5 percentage points higher than the CPI, the EAC is too optimistic. For example, if a program’s TCPI is 1.2 and the cumulative CPI is 0.9, it is not expected that the contractor can improve its performance that much through the remainder of the program. To meet the EAC, the contractor must produce $1.20 worth of work for every $1.00 spent. Given the contractor’s actual performance of $0.90 worth of work for every $1.00 spent, it is unlikely that it can improve its performance that much. One could conclude that the contractor’s EAC is unrealistic and that it underestimates the final cost.
Performance reported early in a program tends to be a good predictor of how the program will perform later, because early control account budgets tend to have a greater probability of being achieved than those scheduled to be executed later. DOD’s contract analysis experience suggests that all contracts are front-loaded to some degree, simply because more is known about near-term work than far-term.
In addition to the performance indexes, three other useful calculations for assessing program performance are:
percent planned = BCWS/BAC,
percent complete = BCWP/BAC, and
percent spent = ACWP/BAC.
Taken together, these formulas measure how well a program is performing. For example, if percent planned is much greater than percent complete, the program is significantly behind schedule. Similarly, if percent spent is much greater than percent complete, the program is significantly overrunning its budget.
Graph the Data to Discover Trends
EVM data should be graphed to determine trends. These trends provide valuable information about a program’s performance, which is important for accurately predicting costs at completion. Knowing what has caused problems in the past can help determine whether they will continue in the future.
Trend analysis should plot current and cumulative EVM data and track the use of management reserve for a complete view of program status and an indication of where problems exist. Typical EVM data trend plots that can provide managers insight into program performance are:
BAC and contractor EAC over the life of the contract,
cumulative and current cost variance trends,
cumulative and current schedule variance trends,
cumulative and current CPI and SPI,
current ACWP—also referred to as the monthly burn rate,
cumulative and current TCPI versus CPI,
format 3 baseline data,
projected versus actual staffing levels from format 4, and
management reserve allocations and rate of expenditure.
Plotting the BAC over the life of the contract will show any contract rebaselines or major contract modifications. BACs that follow a stair-step trend indicate that the program is experiencing changes or major overruns. Both should be investigated to see if the EVM data are still reliable. For example, if the contract has been modified, then an IBR may be necessary to ensure that the changes were incorporated and flowed down to the right control accounts. In figure 32, BAC for an airborne laser program has been plotted over time to show the effect of major contract modifications and program rebaselines.
Figure 32: Understanding Program Cost Growth by Plotting Budget at Completion Trends
Note: The trend examples in figures 32-34, shown for learning purposes, are drawn from GAO, Uncertainties Remain Concerning the Airborne Laser’s Cost and Military Utility, GAO-04-643R (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004), 17-20.
Figure 32 reveals a number of contract modifications, program restructurings, and rebaselines in the airborne laser program which doubled the program cost from 1997 to 2004. The trend data also show instances of major change, making it easy to pinpoint which CPRs should be examined to best understand the circumstances. In this example, cost growth occurred when the program team encountered major problems with manufacturing and integrating advanced optics and laser components. Initial cost estimates underestimated the complexity in developing these critical technologies, and funding was insufficient to cover these risks. To make matters worse, the team relied on rapid prototyping to develop these technologies faster, and it performed limited subcomponent testing. These shortcuts resulted in substantial rework when parts failed during integration.
In addition to examining BAC trends, it is helpful to plot cumulative and current cost and schedule variances for a high-level view of how a program is performing. If downward trends are apparent, the next step is to isolate where these problems are in the WBS. Figure 33 shows trends of increasing cost and schedule variance associated with the airborne laser program.
Figure 33: Understanding Program Performance by Plotting Cost and Schedule Variances
Note: The trend examples in figures 32-34, shown for learning purposes, are drawn from GAO, Uncertainties Remain Concerning the Airborne Laser’s Cost and Military Utility, GAO-04-643R (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004), 17-20.
In figure 33, cost variance steadily declined over fiscal year 2003, from an unfavorable $50 million to an almost $300 million overrun. At the same time, schedule variance also declined, but during the first half of the year it leveled off, after the program hired additional staff in March to meet schedule objectives. While the additional staff helped regain the schedule, it also caused the cost variance to worsen. Plotting both cost and schedule variances makes a wealth of information visible. Management can rely on this information to discover where attention is needed most.
Plotting various EACs along with the contractor’s estimate at completion is a good way to determine whether the contractor’s estimate is reasonable. Figure 34, for example, shows expected cost overruns at contract completion for the airborne laser program.
Figure 34: Understanding Expected Cost Overruns at by Plotting Estimate at Completion
Note: The trend examples in figures 32-34, shown for learning purposes, are drawn from GAO, Uncertainties Remain Concerning the Airborne Laser’s Cost and Military Utility, GAO-04-643R (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004), 17-20.
Figure 34 plots various EACs that GAO generated from the contractor’s EVM data. GAO’s independent EACs showed that an overrun between $400 million and almost $1 billion could be expected from recent program performance. The contractor, in contrast, was predicting no overrun at completion despite the fact that the program had already incurred a cost overrun of almost $300 million, as shown in figure 33. The program was facing huge technology development problems, which made it unlikely that the contractor could finish the program without additional cost variances. Indeed, there was no evidence that the contractor could improve its performance enough to erase the almost $300 million cumulative cost variance. Knowing this, the reasonable conclusion was that the contractor’s estimate at completion was not realistic, given that it was adding more personnel to the contract and still facing increasing amounts of uncompleted work from prior years.
Other trends can offer insight into program performance. To check the reasonableness of a contractor’s estimate at completion, analysts can compare the CPI, current and cumulative, with the TCPI to determine if historical trends support the contractor’s EAC.
Analysts may plot the ACWP, or monthly burn rate. If the plot shows an increase, the analyst needs to determine whether the growth stems from the work becoming more complex as the program progresses or from overtime being initiated to make up for schedule delays. Analysts can review monthly ACWP and BCWP trends to determine what is being accomplished for the amount spent. In figures 33 and 34, for example, it is evident that the program was paying a larger staff to make a technological breakthrough rather than paying existing staff overtime to meet schedule goals. It is important to know the reasons for variances so that management can make decisions about the best course of action. For the program illustrated in figures 33 and 34, GAO recognized that because the airborne laser program was in a period of technology discovery that could not be forced to a specific schedule, any cost estimate would be highly uncertain. Therefore, we recommended that the agency develop a new cost estimate for completing technology development and perform an uncertainty analysis to quantify its level of confidence in that estimate.
Other trend analyses include plotting CPR format 3 data over time to determine whether the budget is being revised to reshape the baseline. Comparing planned to actual staffing levels—using a waterfall chart to analyze month-to-month profiles—can help determine whether work is behind schedule for lack of available staff.55 This type of trend analysis can also be used to determine whether projected staffing levels shown in CPR format 4 represent an unrealistic expectation of growth in labor resources.
Finally, plotting the allocation and burn rate of management reserve is helpful for tracking and analyzing risk. Management reserve is a budget tool to help manage risks, so analyzing its rate of allocation is important. When management reserve is consumed, any further risk that is realized can only be manifested as unfavorable cost variance. Risks from the cost estimate uncertainty analysis should be compared against the management reserve allocation to understand where in the WBS risks are turning into issues. This analysis is a best practice because it further ties the cost estimating risk analysis with EVM. It can prevent the allocation of budget whenever a program encounters a problem, ensuring that as more complicated tasks occur later in the program, management reserve will be available to mitigate any problems. Therefore, to meet this best practice, risks in the cost estimate should be identified up front and conveyed to the EVM analysts so they can track risks in specific WBS elements.
An alarming situation arises if the CPR shows that management reserves are being used faster than the program is progressing toward completion. For example, management should be concerned if a program has used 80 percent of its management reserves but has completed only 40 percent of its work. EVM experts agree that a program’s management reserves should be sufficient to mitigate identified program risk so that budget will always be available to cover unexpected problems. This is especially important toward the latter half of a program, when adequate management reserve is needed to cover problems during testing and evaluation. When management reserve is depleted, the analyst should be alert to contractor requests to increase the contract value to avoid variances.
Review the Format 5 Variance Analysis
After determining which WBS elements are causing cost or schedule variances, examining the format 5 variance analysis can help determine the technical reasons for variances, what corrective action plans are in place, and whether or not the variances are recoverable. Corrective action plans for cost and schedule variances should be tracked through the risk mitigation process. In addition, favorable cost variances should be evaluated to see if they are positive as a result of performance without actual cost having been recorded. This can happen when accounting accruals lag behind invoice payments. Finally, the variance analysis report should discuss any contract rebaselines, and whether any authorized unpriced work exists and what it covers.
Total float is the amount of time an activity can be delayed or extended before delay affects the program’s finish date. A lag is used in a schedule to denote the passing of time between two activities. Lags cannot represent work and cannot be assigned resources. Date constraints can be placed on an activity’s start or finish date to override network logic. They can limit the movement of an activity to the past or future or both. See GAO. Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules, GAO-16-89G. (Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2015) for more information.↩︎
A waterfall chart is made up of floating columns that show how an initial value increases and decreases by a series of intermediate values leading to a final value.↩︎